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Abstract
This paper proposes a new approach for modeling investor fear after rare disasters. The
key element is to take into account that investors’ information about fundamentals driving
rare downward jumps in the dividend process is not perfect. Bayesian learning implies
that beliefs about the likelihood of rare disasters drop to a much more pessimistic level
once a disaster has occurred. Such a shift in beliefs can trigger massive declines in price-
dividend ratios. Pessimistic beliefs persist for some time. Thus, belief dynamics are a source
of apparent excess volatility relative to a rational expectations benchmark. Due to the low
frequency of disasters, even an inﬁnitely-lived investor will remain uncertain about the exact
probability. Our analysis is conducted in continuous time and oﬀers closed-form solutions
for asset prices. We distinguish between rational and adaptive Bayesian learning. Rational
learners account for the possibility of future changes in beliefs in determining their demand
for risky assets, while adaptive learners take beliefs as given. Thus, risky assets tend to be
lower-valued and price-dividend ratios vary less under adaptive versus rational learning for
identical priors.
Keywords: beliefs, Bayesian learning, controlled diﬀusions and jump processes, learning
about jumps, adaptive learning, rational learning
JEL classiﬁcation: D83, G11, C11, D91, E21, D81, C611. Introduction
In the past twenty years, stock prices in the United States and other markets around the
world experienced one boom and two busts. The boom took place in the second half of the
1990s, the ﬁrst bust in the year 2000 and the second one at the end of 2008. Figure 1 shows
that, in the US market, fundamentals have played a role in both bust episodes. In both
cases, dividends and earnings exhibited a drop of 20 to 30 percent within a short period
of time. Strikingly, price-dividend (P-D) and price-earnings (P-E) ratios started to decline
massively shortly after the drop in dividends. The fall in prices over and above the reduction
in dividends or earnings was particularly pronounced and rapid after the 2008 episode.
Clearly, achieving a better understanding of the factors that drive the movement of asset
prices following a rare stock market crash is of great importance not only for researchers and
investors, but also for policymakers keen to assess the extent of negative impact on overall
economic activity. For example, they may wonder whether these asset price movements
reﬂect information about the duration and frequency of such crashes, or whether they are
driven by irrational fear and panic among investors.
This paper presents a new approach for modeling investor fear under uncertainty about
the likelihood of rare disasters. It relates two diﬀerent literatures on asset-pricing that have
proceeded mostly separately from one another. First, there is the large literature on learn-
ing under parameter uncertainty. It recognizes that market participants lack knowledge
of many key parameters characterizing ﬁnancial markets. In a recent survey, Pastor and
Veronesi (2009a), point out that “many facts (in ﬁnancial markets) that appear baﬄing at
ﬁrst sight seem less puzzling once we recognize that parameters are uncertain and subject
to learning”.1 The other literature aims to explain asset pricing puzzles as a consequence
1 Recent studies include Pastor and Veronesi (2009b), who investigate the emergence of bubbles when average
productivity of a new technology is uncertain and subject to learning, and Weitzman (2007), who argues
1of disaster risk while maintaining the assumption of rational expectations. First proposed
by Rietz (1988), this idea received renewed interest once Barro (2006, 2009) showed that
empirically plausible disaster probabilities provide a powerful explanation of historical eq-
uity premia.2 Weitzman (2007), however, questions the disaster risk literature by pointing
to the “inherent implausibility of being able to meaningfully calibrate rational-expectations-
equilibria objective frequency distributions of rare disasters because the rarer the event the
more uncertain is our estimate of its probability.”
Our paper addresses Weitzman’s criticism head-on and incorporates parameter uncer-
tainty and Bayesian learning in a disaster-risk asset-pricing model. Similarly to Longstaﬀ and
Piazzesi (2004), Barro (2006, 2009) and Weitzman (2007), we use the Lucas (1978) exchange-
economy asset-pricing model as a vehicle for conducting our analysis. As in Longstaﬀ and
Piazzesi (2004) and Barro (2006, 2009) we assume that dividends follow a jump-diﬀusion
process in continuous time. This process includes a standard Brownian motion with drift
that is interrupted by rare downward jumps. In the disaster risk literature, the probability
that such a crash occurs within a given period of time may be ﬁxed or time-varying but
its stochastic properties are always assumed known to investors. We refer to this measure
of the frequency of disasters as the hazard rate and consider a time-variable setup with
the hazard rate switching between a high and low value at a given probability.3 Under
that learning about the parameter that controls the spread of the distribution of future consumption growth
helps explain equity premia and excess volatility relative to the rational expectations benchmark.
2 Earlier on, Longstaﬀ and Piazzesi (2004) had also calibrated a Rietz-type model with large downward
dividend jumps using data from the Great Depression. More recently, Barro and Ursua (2008) put together
a large international dataset on consumption and disasters and Barro et al. (2010) provided new estimates
of the variability and persistence of disaster risk. Gabaix (2008, 2010), Wachter (2011) and Gourio (2008a,b)
show that variable disaster risk serves to explain excessive volatility of price-dividend ratios. See also, LeRoy
(2008) for a survey on asset-pricing excess volatility and existing approaches for diagnosing it in the data.
3 The inverse of the hazard rate is the number of periods it takes for a jump to occur on average. So, if a
hazard rate is high, then rare disasters are more frequent on average, meaning that any underlying sources
of rare disasters create a more hazardous environment. Technically, nature’s true disaster-shock process is a
random mixture of two Poisson processes, one with a high (constant) hazard rate and one with a low one.
The probability that the disaster is drawn from the high or low hazard rate process is also constant.
2rational expectations—the starting point of our analysis—this probability is known, and
consequently also the average hazard rate, that is the average frequency of disasters. Fol-
lowing Weitzman’s critique, we proceed by treating this probability as unknown and model
investors’ beliefs and learning about the average hazard rate explicitly.4 In other words, we
consider Bayesian learning about the key parameter governing the frequency of disasters.
Bayes’ rule implies that investors’ beliefs abruptly drop to a more pessimistic level fol-
lowing a stock market crash. Investors suddenly fear that such disasters will occur much
more frequently in the future than they had thought in the past. Here, pessimism or fear
is not meant to suggest investor irrationality. Rather, increased pessimism simply means
that investors’ perceived value of the probability assigned to the high hazard rate case has
risen. The exact deﬁnition of investor rationality under Bayesian learning will be laid out
further below. Over time, investors revise their beliefs by repeatedly applying Bayes’ rule.
Bayesian learning makes eﬃcient use of historical information and new data. In the absence
of another crash, beliefs slowly turn more optimistic and learning implies a smooth reduction
in the perceived probability of the high-hazard-rate case. Thus, investors’ pessimistic beliefs
exhibit a certain degree of persistence after a disaster has occurred.
In our model, asymptotic beliefs are unbiased. However, even inﬁnitely-lived investors
would never reach full conﬁdence about the average frequency of disasters, as would be the
case under rational expectations. This result is due to the slow arrival of information about
the frequency of rare disasters. Despite using Bayes’ rule for updating priors, posteriors
never catch up with nature’s parameters with inﬁnite precision, even if an inﬁnitely long
history of actual data has been processed. These belief dynamics lend additional support
to Weitzman’s claim that analysis of rare-disaster-risk requires the modeling of subjective
4 An alternative approach to modeling the impact of uncertainty about rare events on asset prices is oﬀered
by robust control in the presence of Knightian model uncertainty (see Liu, Pan and Wang (2005) for an
implementation).
3expectations and investor learning.
Asset prices depend on investors’ beliefs about the unknown parameter governing the
frequency of rare disasters. We solve analytically for the relationship between asset prices
and beliefs regarding disaster probability. Using this asset pricing formula, we ﬁnd that
the abrupt increase in pessimism following a crash causes a sudden drop in price-dividend
ratios. The extent of the decline in the asset price over and above the fall in dividends
is entirely due to the shift in beliefs. Under rational expectations, jumps in prices and
dividends would be proportional and the ratio would remain the same.5 The subsequent
persistence in pessimistic beliefs implies that the price-dividend ratio remains depressed for
some time. It recovers slowly as long as no other crash occurs and investors’ beliefs assign
successively lower probabilities to the high-frequency-disaster case.
The link between asset prices and beliefs is derived by solving the dynamic optimization
problem of the representative investor/household in our asset pricing model. In this context,
we distinguish between a fully rational investor and one who learns in an adaptive fashion.
Both, the rational and the adaptive learner base their decision on current beliefs regarding
disaster probabilities that were obtained by applying Bayes rule to available data. The
distinction between rational and adaptive Bayesian learning depends on whether or not
the decision maker takes into account the dynamic transition equations of beliefs in her
optimization problem, in addition to the other recursions governing laws of motion of state
variables such as the dividend process. In other words, a rational learner knows that her
beliefs will change in the future as new information arrives. In particular, as long as no
5 Here our setup diﬀers from other studies that introduce time-variable disaster risk in rational-expectations
asset-pricing models (cf. Gabaix (2008, 2010), Gourio (2008b) and Wachter (2011)). While their speciﬁ-
cations of time-variable disaster risk are useful for explaining excess volatility under rational expectations,
we aim to show that such variations in P-D ratios could even be exclusively due to changes in investors’
subjective perceptions of disaster risk. Our setup implies a constant P-D ratio under rational expectations,
because the average hazard rate is known and independent of past developments.
4crash occurs the perceived hazard rate will smoothly decline. The adaptive learner acts as
if her beliefs will never change. Only as time advances, she re-calculates her estimate of the
average hazard rate according to Bayes rule.6 In this manner, adaptive Bayesian learning
represents a well-deﬁned deviation from fully rational behavior. Any diﬀerence between asset
prices under adaptive versus rational Bayesian learning could then be characterized as being
due to overly pessimistic or optimistic views.7
Under certain plausible conditions, we ﬁnd that asset prices under rational learning are
always higher than prices that follow from the behavior of adaptively learning investors for
any given prior belief. This ﬁnding can be attributed to the fact that rational learners
take into account that their estimates of disaster probabilities will change in the future.
Speciﬁcally, in the absence of another crash they anticipate the gradual emergence of a more
optimistic outlook. Thus, they demand more of the risky asset.
A recent paper that also investigates Bayesian learning about rare jumps is Benzoni,
Colline-Dufresne and Goldstein (2011). These authors aim to explain the dramatic and
lasting steepening of the implied volatility curve for equity index options after the 1987 stock
market crash despite minimal changes in aggregate consumption. Similar to our approach,
they consider learning about high versus low disaster intensity, but in their model jumps are
in perceived dividends while the actual process is smooth. Benzoni et al (2011) provide a
6 For other work distinguishing adaptive and rational Bayesian learning see Guidolin and Timmermann
(2007), Cogley and Sargent (2008), and Koulovatianos, Mirman, and Santugini (2009). Adaptive learning
reﬂects the anticipated utility concept studied, e.g., by Kreps (1998), Cogley and Sargent (2008), and
Koulovatianos and Wieland (2011). Rational Bayesian learning may involve active experimentation, for
example in the presence of multiplicative parameter uncertainty (see Mirman, Urbano and Samuelson (1993),
Wieland (2000a,b) and Beck and Wieland (2002)). Recent work on asset pricing explores the role of Bayesian
learning in booms and busts (see Benhabib and Dave (2011) for adaptive learning and Adam and Marcet
(2010) for rational beliefs). Bansal and Shaliastovich (2011) present a model in which income and dividends
are smooth but asset prices exhibit large moves. These jumps arise from rational learning by investors about
an unobserved state.
7 Our model with subjective beliefs about disaster risk and learning may also oﬀer a more useful refer-
ence point for comparison with behavioral ﬁnance research on the consequences of investor sentiment and
overreaction (cf. Barberis et al. (1998)) than the standard rational expectations benchmark.
5numerical approximation to the solution for a given parameterization of their model, while
we obtain an analytical solution to our model and derive price-dividend ratios explicitly as
a function of investor beliefs. Furthermore, we distinguish between rational and adaptive
learning and investigate the pricing implications.
Furthermore, we discovered an older yet unpublished study by Comon (2001) which also
introduces rational Bayesian learning with extreme events.8 Comon introduces parameter
uncertainty regarding the hazard rate of rare dividend jumps in a variant of the Cox, Inger-
soll and Ross (1985) exchange economy. Contrary to our approach, he assumes that prior
subjective hazard rates of investors are Gamma distributed. One consequence of his frame-
work is that learning only matters in inﬂuencing price-dividend ratios during the transition
to rational expectations, which complicates empirical identiﬁcation.
Finally, we calibrate our model and conduct dynamic simulations that illustrate the
model’s potential to capture key elements of the dynamic path of price-dividend ratios
following the two crashes in the U.S. stock market in 2000 and 2008 shown in Figure 1.
The calibration requires setting an initial prior belief on the average hazard rate of disasters.
It turns out that it is possible to generate sudden drops followed by slowly improving P-
D ratios under rational and adaptive learning. However, the adaptive learning simulation
requires a prior belief that is roughly twice as optimistic as under rational learning. Since
beliefs are the main driver of P-D dynamics in our model, it is of great interest to compare
the behavior of model beliefs with survey data on investors’ perception of the threat of a
crash. Fortunately, such data is available in the form of Robert Shiller’s Crash Conﬁdence
Index. The questionnaire underlying this data is explained in Shiller, Kon-Ya and Tsutsui
(1996). Interestingly, our simulations of the boom and busts in the U.S. stock market are
8 We are grateful to Pietro Veronesi for mentioning it in commenting on the ﬁrst version of our paper and
to Comon’s adviser at Harvard, John Campbell, for scanning and sending us chapter 1 of his dissertation.
6broadly consistent with dynamics of the beliefs indicated by the survey.
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 presents the asset pricing
model under rational expectations and demonstrates our solution approach. In Section 3,
we then analyze and compare the decision making of households/investors that learn in an
adaptive or rational Bayesian fashion. In the fourth section, closed-form solutions for asset
prices are derived. To illustrate the power of the model to ﬁt the behavior of price-dividend
ratios and survey measures of beliefs following the last two crashes in the U.S. stock market,
we present dynamic simulations conditional on given priors and the timing of these two
busts. An extension to Epstein-Zin preferences, which do not restrict the intertemporal
elasticity of substitution to be equal to the inverse of the coeﬃcient of relative risk aversion,
is discussed in Section 5. It is meant to address concerns regarding the special nature of the
standard asset-pricing model with constant relative risk aversion (CRRA) preferences (see,
for example, Barro (2009)and Wachter (2011)). Section 6 concludes.
2. Benchmark Model without Learning
The model is a simple representative-agent Lucas (1978) tree economy with rare jumps in
the dividend process in the spirit of Barro (2006), analyzed in continuous time. The dividend
process is given by,
dD(t)
D(t)
= μdt + σdz(t)+dq(t), ( 1 )
in which dz (t) is a standard Brownian motion, i.e., dz (t)=ε(t)
√
dt,w i t hε(t) ∼ N (0,1),
for all t ≥ 0. Moreover, q(t) is a Poisson process driving random downward jumps in
dividends of size ζ · D(t), where ζ ∈ (0,1) is a random variable with given time-invariant
distribution having compact support, Z⊂(0,1). In particular, the Poisson process q(t)i s
7characterized by,
dq(t)=
⎧
⎪ ⎨
⎪ ⎩
−ζ
0
with Probability λ(t)dt
with Probability 1 − λ(t)dt
(2)
The hazard rate of the Poisson process, λ(t) in equation (2), is also random, taking two
values only.9 In particular, the density of λ is characterized by the binomial distribution,
λ(t)=
⎧
⎪ ⎨
⎪ ⎩
λh
λl
with Probability π∗
with Probability 1 − π∗
,( 3 )
for all t ≥ 0, and with λh >λ l > 0, and π∗ ∈ (0,1). We assume that variables z (t), q (t),
λ(t), and ζ are all independent from each other at all times.
Consistently with the growing variable-disaster-risk literature (see, for example, Gabaix
(2010) and Wachter (2011)) our variable-hazard-rate also assumes that exogenous factors
driving the hazard rate of rare disasters change over time.10 The extension that investors
may be unaware of the frequency of such shifts in hazard rates, π∗, is a plausible environment
of learning, which is the learning application we pursue in later sections.
Under rational expectations, at any instant, t ≥ 0, two independent random events
related to disasters are revealed. The ﬁrst event is whether a rare disaster has occurred at
t or not. The second event revealed is the regime of riskiness from which the rare-disaster
event at t has been drawn (λh indicates rare-disaster risk coming from a more hazardous
exogenous regime compared to the case of λl). Given these assumptions, Proposition 1
clariﬁes the stochastic law of motion governing the dynamics of the Poisson process q(t).11
9 By the term “hazard rate” we mean the average number of downward jumps in the dividend process per
unit of time. The interpretation of the inverse of the hazard rate is the number of periods it takes for a
jump to occur on average. So, if a hazard rate is high, then rare disasters are more frequent on average,
meaning that any underlying sources of rare disasters create a more hazardous environment. Barro (2006)
and Wachter (2011) both use the term “disaster probability” for expressing what is our hazard-rate concept
throughout this paper.
10The stochastic process driving hazard-rate variability over time in Wachter (2011) and Gabaix (2010) is
diﬀerent from ours.
11For an introduction to Poisson processes and their application to continuous-time optimization modeling
8Proposition 1 Under the stochastic structure of hazard rates given by (3), the
dynamics of q (t) implied by nature, are governed by the stochastic equation,
dq (t)=
⎧
⎪ ⎨
⎪ ⎩
−ζ
0
with Probability λ
∗dt
with Probability 1 − λ
∗dt
(4)
where λ
∗ ≡ Eπ∗ (λ)=π∗λh +( 1− π∗)λl is the expected hazard rate.
Proof See Appendix A. 
By construction, nature’s stochastic process λ(t) has independent increments. Equation
(4) in Proposition 1 clariﬁes that, no matter which hazard rate applies at time t ≥ 0
(i.e., λh vs. λl), at time instant t + dt, the hazard rate that applies for forward-looking
decision making is equal to the hazard-rate expectation driven by parameter π∗,w h i c hi s
equal to Eπ∗ (λ)=π∗λh +( 1− π∗)λl.G i v e n t h a t λ(t) and all other random variables
comply with the independent-increments assumption, dividend-process innovations exhibit
no persistence over time. In the representative-agent Lucas-tree-fruit economy consumption
equals dividends in equilibrium. So, asset pricing under rational expectations fully reﬂects
this feature of serially uncorrelated dividend innovations. By contrast, once we introduce
rational learning, Bayes’ rule implies that beliefs exhibit persistence, which is then reﬂected
in pricing. So, our assumption that dividend innovations are serially uncorrelated by nature
help in conveying the special role of belief-driven persistence introduced to asset pricing
through Bayesian learning about disasters.
The Lucas-tree-fruit economy is an exchange economy of a large number of identical
inﬁnitely-lived agents of total mass equal to one. Agents trade only one risky asset, the mar-
ket portfolio, which has returns given by equation (1). The representative agent maximizes
see, for example, Merton (1971, pp. 395-401), Kushner (1967, Ch. 9), Dreyfus (1965, pp. 470-472), Karlin
and Taylor (1981, Ch. 16), Cox and Miller (1965, Ch. 9), Papoulis (1991, pp. 367-375) and Dixit and
Pindyck (1994, pp. 85-87).
9her expected lifetime utility given by,
E0
   ∞
0
e
−ρtc(t)
1−γ − 1
1 − γ
dt
 
(5)
with c(t) denoting an individual’s consumption, with ρ>0 being the rate of time preference,
and with γ ≥ 0 being the coeﬃcient of relative risk aversion (the special case of γ =0
corresponds to a risk-neutral investor, and is possible to be studied in the context of a
representative-agent Lucas-tree economy). At any time t ≥ 0, an individual holds s(t) ≥ 0
shares of the risky asset. At time t = 0, the aggregate supply of the asset is S (0) > 0, and
there is no new issuing of shares, so S (t)=S (0) for all t ≥ 0. Moreover, at time t =0 ,
the endowment of a representative individual is s(0) = S (0). The budget constraint in
continuous time is,12
ds(t)=
1
P (t)
[s(t)D(t) − c(t)]dt .( 6 )
In what follows we construct the Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman (HJB) equation in order to
achieve two goals. First, the HJB equation introduces a recursive language that eﬃciently
describes the distinction made between the adaptive learner vs. the rational learner regarding
the way the two utilize new information in their forward-looking decision problem. Second,
the HJB equation introduces a common solution technique through undetermined coeﬃcients
that tackles three problems: (a) the rational-expectations (RE) agent economy, (b) the
adaptive-learner (AL) economy, and (c) the rational-learner (RL) economy.
12For the derivation of equation (6) from its discrete-time counterpart, which is
Ptst = st−1 (Pt + Dt) − ct ,
notice that the above equation can be re-written as
Δst ≡ st − st−1 =
 
st−1
Dt
Pt
−
ct
Pt
 
Δt ,
where Δt = 1 under the convention that the discrete-time period length is unity. In continuous time, taking
the limit Δt → 0 results in (6) .
10In order to solve the pricing problem an individual agent must determine her demand
for the risky asset at any time t ≥ 0. So, given any possible path (P (t))t≥0 generated by
a price function with P (t) > 0 for all t ≥ 0, the agent must pick the paths (s(t),c(t))t≥0
that maximize her utility given by (5), subject to (6) and (1). Yet, the determination of
these demand functions is a stationary discounted dynamic programming problem that can
be solved through a recursive functional-choice problem given by a HJB equation with no
time indices.
In order to formulate the HJB equation of RE, we assume a pricing rule,
P =Ψ
RE (D),
and we denote a value function that is subject to the pricing rule ΨRE (D)b yJRE  
s,D | ΨRE 
.
The HJB equation is,
ρJ
RE  
s,D | Ψ
RE 
=m a x
c≥0
 
c1−γ − 1
1 − γ
+ J
RE
s
 
s,D | Ψ
RE 
·
 
1
ΨRE (D)
(sD − c)
 
+
+J
RE
D
 
s,D | Ψ
RE 
· μD + J
RE
DD
 
s,D | Ψ
RE  (σD)
2
2
+
+λ
∗  
Eζ
 
J
RE  
s,(1 − ζ)D | Ψ
RE  
− J
RE  
s,D | Ψ
RE  
 
,( 7 )
with Eζ denoting the expectations operator with respect to the random variable ζ only. In
Appendix A we derive an analytical solution for the value function JRE  
s,D | ΨRE 
,a n d
show that, as reported by Barro (2006),13
P =Ψ
RE (D)=
1
ρ − χ − λ
∗ξ
· D ,( 8 )
where
χ ≡ (1 − γ)
 
μ − γ
σ2
2
 
,a n d ξ ≡ Eζ
 
(1 − ζ)
1−γ 
− 1.
13Our parameter λ
∗ in the pricing formula matches up with parameter p in equation (17), page 839, in Barro
(2006).
11In the special case of γ =1 ,χ = ξ = 0, and the pricing function given by (8) implies
ΨRE (D)=D/ρ. This means that the presence of risk does not aﬀect pricing, no matter if
this risk stems from the diﬀusion or from the jump process. In general,
ξ  0 ⇔ γ  1. ( 9 )
The parametric relationship given by (9) implies that increasing the expected hazard rate, λ
∗,
decreases prices only if γ<1. If γ>1, which can be loosely interpreted as having higher
risk aversion, increasing the expected hazard rate, λ
∗, increases prices. This paradoxical
result has been discussed by Bansal and Yaron (2004, p. 1487), and also by Barro (2009, p.
249). Both of these studies attribute the paradox to the fact that, with power utility, the
coeﬃcient of relative risk aversion and the elasticity of intertemporal substitution cannot
be disentangled, as the one equals the reciprocal of the other. As a resolution to this rigid
feature of CRRA preferences, the studies by Bansal and Yaron (2004) and Barro (2009)
suggest the use of Epstein-Zin (1989) utility functions. In our learning application, expected
hazard rates will be moving over time together with beliefs, so a parameter-value choice
γ<1v s .γ>1 becomes important for some additional mechanics related to learning. To
tackle such calibration concerns we discuss possible extensions to Duﬃe-Epstein (1992a,b)
preferences in Section 5.
3. Bayesian Learning about the Likelihood of Jumps
3.1 Characterization of Beliefs
Our formulation of beliefs aims at retaining analytical tractability when incorporating belief
dynamics implied by Bayes rule. Thus, we take only a small but still very inﬂuential step
away from rational expectations. Our investors cannot observe which hazard rate (λh vs.
λl) is triggered by nature at any point in time. An investor observes stock market crashes
12but is unable to collect data on histories of hazard-rate realizations (dates and number of
instances in which λh vs. λl have been triggered in the past). Given this ignorance, instead
of considering π∗ with inﬁnite precision, at any time t ≥ 0 the investor has subjective priors
denoted by π(t). We maintain that the investors’ perceived hazard rate corresponds to
the subjectively weighted average of λh or λl,w i t hλh >λ l > 0. In addition, she remains
informed of the distribution of ζ, which is time-invariant. In sum, at any time t ≥ 0, a
learning investor’s beliefs about random hazard rates are given by the Bernoulli distribution
˜ λ(t)=
⎧
⎪ ⎨
⎪ ⎩
λh
λl
with Probability π (t)
with Probability 1 − π (t)
, (10)
where the tilde denotes random variables governed by distributions that depend on subjective
beliefs about some parameters, as opposed to random variables governed by distributions
that exclusively depend on nature’s true parameters. The tilde refers to an investor’s subjec-
tive perception about her beliefs, before new information has been revealed. Since there is a
distinction between dynamics of ex-post beliefs (after information has arrived) and ex-ante
beliefs (before information has arrived), a tilde denotes ex-ante beliefs. Following the same
argument as the one in the proof of Proposition 1, we can directly state that, based on (10),
the subjective perception of process q(t) by the investor at time t ≥ 0i s ,
d˜ q(t)=
⎧
⎪ ⎨
⎪ ⎩
−ζ
0
with Probability Λ(π (t))dt
with Probability 1 − Λ(π (t))dt
, (11)
where
Λ(π(t)) ≡ λhπ(t)+λl [1 − π(t)] , (12)
i.e., perceived hazard rate equals the expected hazard rate according to priors π (t), Eπ
 
˜ λ(t)
 
=
Λ(π (t)). Notice the special case resulting from the deﬁnition given by (12), that λ
∗ =Λ( π∗).
13A similar characterization of beliefs has been used by Keller and Rady (2010). They
study a game-theoretical application of learning with Poisson diﬀerential equations (Poisson
bandits) analytically, while we analyze the optimal control problem of an investor in an asset
pricing model with additional states due to dividends and shares.
3.2 Bayesian updating of prior beliefs on disaster risk
New information about disasters is restricted to observing whether a disaster has occurred
or not. So, after new information has been incorporated, the only variable putting into
motion beliefs about the perceived average hazard rate, Λ(π (t)) = λhπ(t)+λl [1 − π(t)], is
probability π(t). Proposition 2 characterizes the Bayesian-learning dynamics of π (t).
Proposition 2 After applying Bayes’ rule, from a modeler’s perspective, the
dynamics of the posterior belief about π, based on the prior π(t), are compre-
hensively characterized by the Poisson diﬀerential equation
dπ = −δπ(1 − π)dt + dqπ , (13)
where δ ≡ λh − λl,a n d
dqπ =
⎧
⎪ ⎨
⎪ ⎩
λhπ
Λ(π) − π
0
with Probability λ
∗dt
with Probability 1 − λ
∗dt
. (14)
Proof See Appendix B. 
What equation (14) reveals is that beliefs about π jump from π to λhπ/Λ(π) whenever
a jump in the dividend process occurs (with the average frequency of such events driven by
nature’s average hazard rate λ
∗ =Λ( π∗)). Whenever a jump does not occur, (13) reveals
that average-hazard-rate beliefs, Λ(π (t)), decay towards λl, since the term −δπ(1 − π)dt of
14(13) considered alone, implies that π (t) → 0a st →∞ . Yet, jumps in D aﬀect the term dqπ
in (13), and make π jump upwards, keeping π (t) in the interior of the open interval (0,1).14
Notice that equation (14) refers to learning from the modeler’s (or nature’s) perspective,
which is the reason why nature’s true parameter, λ
∗ has been used. The derivation of the
law of motion for π when nature’s true parameter, π∗, is unknown is the same as in the case
of deriving equations (13) and (14). So, the only feature changing after this new derivation
is that, from a learner’s perspective who makes decisions inside a model, the perception of
the average hazard rate for a rare disaster is Λ(π) instead of λ
∗ =Λ ( π∗). Consequently,
in (14) nature’s true average hazard rate, λ
∗, must be replaced by the average subjective
hazard rate Λ(π). Corollary 1 summarizes this observation, and we state it without proof,
because the reasoning is exactly the same as in the proof of Proposition 2.
Corollary 1 The dynamics of ex-ante perceived beliefs about π by Bayesian
learning agents (denoted by d˜ π), are given by,
d˜ π = −δπ(1 − π)dt + d˜ qπ , (15)
where
d˜ qπ =
⎧
⎪ ⎨
⎪ ⎩
λhπ
Λ(π) − π
0
with Probability Λ(π)dt
with Probability 1 − Λ(π)dt
. (16)
Proposition 2 and Corollary 1 are equivalent to an application of optimal ﬁltering from
observations of point processes in Liptser and Shiryaev (2001). In fact, equations (15) and
(16) correspond to equation (19.86) in Liptser and Shiryaev (2001, pp. 332-3). However, we
provide a more intuitive proof that was derived independently, because we had only been
14In the next section we prove that that π (t) ∈ (0,1) for all t ≥ 0, and tends to move around π∗ on average
as t →∞(see Proposition 3 about the asymptotic behavior of E [π (t)]).
15made aware of Liptser and Shiryaev’s result used by Benzoni et al. (2011) after having
completed the ﬁrst draft of our paper.
3.3 Long-Run Dynamics of Learning
A crucial question concerning belief dynamics is whether nature’s average hazard rate, λ
∗,
is learned in the long run in the sense of Muth’s (1961) concept of asymptotic convergence
to rational expectations. Proposition 3 answers this question formally.
Proposition 3 Let beliefs about the occurrence of a jump event be given by
equation (13). Then for all π (0) = π0 ∈ (0,1), π (t) ∈ (0,1) for all t ≥ 0, and
lim
t→∞
E [π(t)] = π
∗, (17)
while
lim
t→∞
Va r[π (t)] =
 
λ
∗ − 4λl +
 
(λ
∗)
2 +8 λ
∗λh
  1
2
 2
16δ
2 − (π
∗)
2 > 0 . (18)
Proof See Appendix B. 
Proposition 3 states that, after collecting inﬁnite rare-disaster data drawn from nature’s
realizations, the beliefs of learning investors about π are asymptotically unbiased, but learn-
ers do not reach inﬁnite precision about this limiting average parameter.The variance of belief
parameter π(t) is bounded away from 0 as indicated by equation (18). Thus, rare disasters
arrive at such low frequency that they leave even an inﬁnitely-lived learner uncertain about
disaster risk, despite that Bayes’ rule is a statistically eﬃcient way of analyzing historical
data. In other words, asymptotic convergence to rational expectations is not achieved.
The result of non-asymptotic convergence to rational expectations supports the idea that
modeling investors in an environment of learning is plausible. Since investors never reach
16inﬁnite subjective precision in our model, we do not need to analyze whether investors are
at a particular stage during their overall learning process. Empirically capturing priors on
belief parameter π(t) alone, is suﬃcient to describe the implied dynamics of learning in our
model. In Section 4 we use survey data collected through a questionnaire described in Shiller
et al. (1996) that approximate belief belief parameter π(t) in order to calibrate our model.
4. Asset Pricing under Adaptive versus Rational Learning
The conceptual distinction between an adaptive learner (AL) and a rational learner (RL)i s
based on how the decision maker accounts for her own ignorance regarding π∗. AL is aware
of her ignorance at the current time instant. However, she simply assumes that her beliefs
will not change in the future. By contrast, RL, apart from being aware of her ignorance at
the current time, is also aware of the future evolution of her beliefs according to Bayes’ rule.
So, RL approaches her lack of information in a fully rational manner, while AL is boundedly
rational, because she neglects the knowledge that beliefs will be revised in the future with
new data.
A direct way of distinguishing adaptive and rational Bayesian learning mathematically
is by setting up the investor’s decision-making problem by means of the Hamilton-Jacobi-
Bellman (HJB) equations. HJB equations are optimization recursions incorporating and
accommodating other recursions that reﬂect the stochastic structure of a problem. Corollary
1 in Section 3 identiﬁes the recursions associated with Bayesian updating, i.e., equations (15)
and (16). While equations (15) and (16) will be included in the HJB equation associated
with RL, they will not ﬁgure in the HJB equation of AL. In the following, we start with
AL’s optimization problem and then proceed to RL’s problem, which is more demanding
from a technical perspective.
174.1 Asset Demand by an Adaptive Learner
At any time t ≥ 0 prior beliefs are given by π(t). The HJB equation of AL is,
ρJ
AL  
s,D,π | Ψ
AL 
=m a x
c≥0
 
c1−γ − 1
1 − γ
+ J
AL
s
 
s,D,π | Ψ
AL 
·
 
1
ΨAL (D,π)
(sD − c)
 
+
+J
AL
D
 
s,D,π | Ψ
AL 
· μD + J
AL
DD
 
s,D,π | Ψ
AL  (σD)
2
2
+
+Λ(π)
 
Eζ
 
J
AL  
s,(1 − ζ)D,π | Ψ
AL  
− J
AL  
s,D,π | Ψ
AL  
 
, (19)
given a pricing rule P =Ψ AL (D,π), and with the dynamics of π being given by equa-
tion (13). First, notice that, unlike the case of RE’s value function, AL’s value function,
JAL  
s,D,π | ΨAL 
, now depends on prior beliefs, π. Second, notice that AL does not an-
ticipate any learning in the future, despite that beliefs are continuously updated over time.
This non-anticipation of learning by AL is captured by the fact that perceived dynamics of
π (captured by equations (15) and (16)) are not incorporated in AL’s HJB equation as it
can be seen by (19). This absolute form of non-anticipation implies that, in the particular
application with jumps and hazard rates that we are examining, at any instant t ≥ 0, AL’s
perception of the average hazard rate is Λ(π (t)), and this perception is not anticipated
to change in the future. This extreme concept of non-anticipation of learning is in accor-
dance with the concept of anticipated utility implied by particular belief priors, analyzed,
for example, in Kreps (1998) and Cogley and Sargent (2008).
4.2 Asset Demand by a Rational Learner
The HJB equation of RL is,
ρJ
RL  
s,D,π | Ψ
RL 
=m a x
c≥0
 
c1−γ − 1
1 − γ
+ J
RL
s
 
s,D,π | Ψ
RL 
·
 
1
ΨRL (D,π)
(sD − c)
 
+
+J
RL
D
 
s,D,π | Ψ
RL 
· μD + J
RL
DD
 
s,D,π | Ψ
RL  (σD)
2
2
+
18−J
RL
π
 
s,D,π | Ψ
RL 
· δπ(1 − π)+
+Λ(π)
 
Eζ
 
J
RL
 
s,(1 − ζ)D,
λhπ
Λ(π)
| Ψ
RL
  
− J
RL  
s,D,π | Ψ
RL 
  
, (20)
given a pricing rule P =Ψ RL (D,π), and while the dynamics of π are driven by equation
(13). What distinguishes RL’s problem from this of AL is that the subjective dynamic
stochastic equations (15) and (16) that calculate the instantaneous change in beliefs, d˜ π (t),
are incorporated in RL’s problem (RL’s anticipation of learning).
Two algebraic terms in RL’s HJB equation capture RL’s anticipation of learning. First,
equation (15) implies that the anticipated change in beliefs in case no jump occurs at the
immediately “adjacent” future instant is equal to −δπ(1 − π)dt. The impact of the instan-
taneous change in beliefs in case of no jumps on lifetime utility is captured by the partial
derivative of JRL with respect to π, JRL
π , which multiplies the diﬀerential term δπ(1 − π)
in equation (20). Second, equation (15) indicates that, in the case a jump indeed occurs
at the immediately “adjacent” future instant, the anticipated change in beliefs is equal to
d˜ qπ = λhπ/Λ(π)−π, which appears in equation (16). The impact of a jump in D on lifetime
utility can be seen by the whole last additive term of equation (20). In this last additive
term of (20), RL acknowledges the impact of the jump on both the level of the dividend, D,
and on the level of beliefs, π.15
4.3 Asset Prices under Adaptive Learning
Since AL’s HJB equation diﬀers from RE’s HJB only in that λ
∗ in RE’s problem has been
replaced by Λ(π), after following all steps in the proof of RE’s asset pricing problem in
15In the case of AL’s decision problem, only the impact of the jump on D is taken into account, as it can be
seen by the last additive term of equation (19). Notice also that the last additive term of equation (20) is
the partial outcome of multi-dimensional stochastic integration with respect to dimensions D and π during
the process of applying the expectations operator on the right-hand side of RL’s HJB equation.
19Appendix A, we arrive at the pricing rule
Ψ
AL(D,π)=
1
ρ − χ − Λ(π)ξ
· D , (21)
while JAL is given by,
J
AL  
s,D,π | Ψ
AL 
=
⎧
⎪ ⎨
⎪ ⎩
ΨAL(D,π)
D
(sD)1−γ
1−γ − 1
ρ(1−γ)
ΨAL(D,π)
D ln(sD)+φ
AL  
π | ΨAL 
,i f γ  =1
,i f γ =1
(22)
where
φ
AL  
π | Ψ
AL 
=
1
ρ
ΨAL (D,π)
D
  
μ −
σ2
2
 
+Λ( π)Eζ [ln(1 − ζ)]
 
=
=
μ − σ2
2 +Λ( π)Eζ [ln(1 − ζ)]
ρ2 . (23)
In particular, RE’s asset pricing problem is the special case of AL’s problem when setting
π = π∗. Yet, a crucial diﬀerence between the two pricing schemes is that in RE’s problem
the perceived average hazard rate is λ
∗ for all t ≥ 0, and thus the P-D ratio implied by
(8), ΨRE (D)/D, is constant over time. On the contrary, concerning AL’s problem if for
some ˆ t ≥ 0, π
 
ˆ t
 
= π∗,t h e nΨ AL 
D,π
 
ˆ t
  
/D =Ψ RE (D)/D, but this equality does not
hold generally, as beliefs, π, driven by the stochastic equation (13) change continuously and
permanently over time.
4.4 Asset Prices under Rational Learning
In Appendix C we prove that the pricing rule implied by RL’s problem is
Ψ
RL (D,π)=
 
π
1
ρ − χ − λhξ
+( 1− π)
1
ρ − χ − λlξ
 
· D , (24)
while JRL is given by,
J
RL  
s,D,π | Ψ
RL 
=
⎧
⎪ ⎨
⎪ ⎩
ΨRL(D,π)
D
(sD)1−γ
1−γ − 1
ρ(1−γ)
ΨRL(D,π)
D ln(sD)+φ
RL  
π | ΨRL 
,i f γ  =1
,i f γ =1
(25)
20where
φ
RL  
π | Ψ
RL 
= φ
AL 
π | Ψ
AL 
. (26)
It is notable that in the case γ = 1, the asset pricing rule is common across RE, AL,
and RL (the P-D ratio is equal to 1/ρ for all). Moreover, only in the case γ =1 ,i ti s
JRL  
s,D,π | ΨRL 
= JAL  
s,D,π | ΨAL 
.
Equations (24) and (21) lead to an immediate qualitative comparison between these two
setups. Corollary 2 makes this comparison.
Corollary 2 For all D>0 and π ∈ (0,1),
ΨAL (D,π)
D

ΨRL (D,π)
D
⇔ γ  1 , (27)
and
∂
ΨAL(D,π)
D
∂π
,
∂
ΨRL(D,π)
D
∂π
 0 ⇔ γ  1 . (28)
Proof Let g (λ) ≡ 1/(ρ − χ − λξ), and assume that the model’s parameters are such
that g (λh),g(λl) > 0. Notice that ΨAL(D,π)=g (πλh +( 1− π)λl), and ΨRL (D,π)=
πg(λh)+( 1− π)g(λl). Since ξ  0 ⇔ γ  1, it follows that g   (λ)  0 ⇔ γ  1,
for all λ ∈ [λl,λ h]. Given these facts above, equation (27) is proved using the deﬁnition of
concavity. Equation (28) is proved directly from (24) and (21), after also taking into account
that ξ  0 ⇔ γ  1. 
Equation (28) implies that pessimism (increasing π) leads to lower demand for assets
and lower equilibrium price, only if γ<1, i.e., only if the coeﬃcient of relative risk aversion
does not depart too much from the preferences of a risk-neutral investor. As discussed in
Section 2 above, setting a value γ>1 plays a counterintuitive role for asset pricing even
in the rational-expectations setting. In the rational-expectations setting we have noticed
that, if γ>1, then assuming higher risk for the model implies higher asset prices. In our
21learning setup, through equation (28), a value γ>1 implies that pessimism (increasing
π) leads to higher demand for assets, which is another counterintuitive result. As Bansal
and Yaron (2004, p. 1487), and Barro (2009, p. 249) comment, CRRA preferences imply a
tight link between the coeﬃcient of relative risk aversion and the elasticity of intertemporal
substitution. They suggest using Epstein-Zin (1989) (Duﬃe-Epstein (1992a,b)) recursive
preferences to resolve such counterintuitive mechanics. We return to this issue in section 5
in the context of learning.
The implication of equation (27) is intuitive once we notice the convexity of the function
g (λ)=1 /(ρ − χ − λξ)w h e nγ<1, that was introduced in the proof of Corollary 2.
As we have emphasized above, at any instant t ≥ 0, AL has beliefs, π, and does not
anticipate further learning. For the empirically plausible case in which the P-D ratio falls
with increasing pessimism (γ<1), the P-D ratio under AL-pricing is higher than the P-D
ratio under RL-pricing, for the same priors π ∈ (0,1). This happens because RL sees the
potential of learning something more optimistic in the future about π, which dominates
anticipated pessimistic information that is possible to arrive and increases the demand for
the asset. This dominance of the more optimistic information out of the whole range of
information that is anticipated to arrive is demonstrated by the convexity of function g (λ)
when γ<1.
4.5 Comparing dynamic model simulations to data on P-D ratios
and survey expectations
This section serves two purposes. First, it uses dynamic simulations of a calibrated version
of our asset pricing model to provide a simple visual illustration of the interaction of disaster
risk, subjective beliefs of investors and price-dividend ratios. This illustration helps improve
our understanding of the analytical results discussed in the preceding sections. Secondly,
22this section examines similarities between actual data on price-dividend ratios and survey
expectations after a stock-market crash and such model simulations. In particular, we inves-
tigate whether the dynamics of subjective beliefs regarding disaster probabilities can cause
P-D ratio drops and persistence similar to the U.S. stock market experience in the last two
decades. We also check whether these belief dynamics remain roughly within the range of
belief variations apparent in surveys of the perceived threat of such a crash. Such a compar-
ison may help to motivate a thorough empirical investigation of the role of subjective beliefs
relative to fundamentals in future research.
The U.S. data on P-D-ratios from Figure 1, is plotted again in the two top panels of
Figure 2 (dashed lines). The dashed lines in the two bottom panels of Figure 2 represent
survey-based beliefs about the likelihood of an imminent stock-market crash in the United
States, produced using a survey method described in Shiller et al. (1996). Shiller’s Crash
Conﬁdence Index (CCI) refers to the percentage of the respondents who stated that the
probability of a stock-market crash occurring within the following semester is less than
10%.16 So, the higher the CCI, the higher the optimism (more accurately, the higher
the fraction of non-pessimistic survey respondents). At the time when the two incidents
of the massive drops in dividends occurred, the Crash Conﬁdence Index (CCI) was at its
lowest level. Most interestingly, after the November 2008 crash, the CCI continued dropping
for almost a year. Stock-market prices broadly seemed to follow the change in beliefs and
declined substantially.17
The spirit of our exercise is to initiate a model simulation in the second semester of the
16Data are taken from the website
http://icf.som.yale.edu/stock-market-confidence-indices-united-states
17An alternative approach to measuring conﬁdence using the cross-section of quarterly real GDP forecasts
from the survey of professional forecasters is presented in Bansal and Shaliastovich (2010). They provide
evidence that conﬁdence and returns are negatively correlated and develop a model with jump-like conﬁdence
shocks and recency-biased learning.
23year 1989 setting a level of initial beliefs for agent RL, πRL
1989, which is close to values from
CCI data. Then we impose two unforeseen jumps, one in the summer of year 2000, and one
in the fall of 2008. To be able to simulate the model, we also need to calibrate a number
of other parameters. In doing so, we choose values close to those used by Barro (2006) for
explaining the equity premium puzzle. Investors’ preference parameters are set to γ =0 .2
and ρ =2 .28%. The parameters of the diﬀusion process with drift are set to μ =2 .5% and
σ =2 % . 18 Regarding the magnitude of the impact of a disaster on dividends, ζ,w eu s ea
generic distribution, in which ζ = 20% with probability 1, if a disaster occurs.
The hazard rates determining disaster risk are set to λh =1 /5, and λl =1 /40. λh =1 /5
implies an upper bound for pessimism, namely that sudden drops in the dividend process
of magnitude 20% arrive once every ﬁve years on average. The most optimistic view, de-
termined by λl =1 /40, is that such jumps arrive once every forty years on average. These
values for λh and λl are not far from hazard rates motivated by rare-disaster data presented
in Barro (2006, 2009). Moreover, the choice of upper bound provides a natural link to the
Crash Conﬁdence Index. Since the hazard rate reﬂects the average rate of disasters per
year, the value λh =1 /5 implies the perceived probability that a disaster may occur with
probability 10% each semester. Since π(t) is the probability placed on such an event, the
CCI index can be proxied by the value 1 − π (t), which can be viewed as the percentage of
respondents who think that there is a lower than 10% probability of disaster (i.e., 1 − π (t)
is interpreted as percentage of respondents who think that the hazard rate is lower than
λh =1 /5)).
The two bottom panels of Figure 2 plot the dynamics of 1 − π (t) (solid lines), under
18Barro (2006) uses these values in order to match historical data on consumption growth and volatility. An
alternative calibration that would match growth and volatility data of dividends during the examined period
would be: μ =9 % ,σ = 10% and, ρ =7 .4%. It would imply the same dynamics, because the magnitude of
the expression ρ − χ is the same.
24rational (bottom-left panel) and adaptive learning (bottom-right panel) that follow from
equation (14) relative to the CCI index (dashed lines). The prior belief regarding the average
hazard rate is to 85 percent for the RL and AL investors, that is πRL
1989 = πAL
1989 = 85%. Thus,
1−π1989 = 15%, which could be compared with a CCI index value indicating a 15% share of
optimistic respondents. Since the dynamics of beliefs, π (t), are driven by the same equation,
and the disaster data is the same (namely, two crashes in 2000 and 2008 respectively), the
evolution of beliefs is the same for both types of investors. These beliefs exhibit variations in
the same range as the CCI index in the last two decades, namely between 20 to 50 percent.
There is a gradual increase in optimism prior to the crashes in 2000 and 2008. A crash causes
a drop to pessimistic levels that persists and is followed by a slow improvement. There are
some diﬀerences and some similarities with the movements of the CCI index. This index
did not rise so much before 2000. However, there is a local minimum around 2000, which
is then followed by a slow improvement to optimistic heights prior to the global ﬁnancial
crisis. Then it rapidly declines reaching a minimum around the Lehman collapse, followed
by another improvement.
The resulting dynamics of the price-dividend ratio are shown in the top panels of Figure
2. Though they share the same beliefs, asset demand by rational and adaptive learners is
diﬀerent and therefore also the evolution of price dividend ratios. As apparent in the top-
left panel, RL investors anticipate more optimistic perceptions in the absence of another
crisis and value the risky asset more highly. The simulation under rational learning thereby
exhibits a continuing increase in the price-dividend ratio throughout the 1990s that almost
reaches the observed U.S. stock market peak prior to the crash in 2000. The simulated P-D
ratio then slowly rises from this depressed level to a lower peak followed by the rash in
2008. The comparison with the actual U.S. P-D data serves to illustrate that variations in
25subjective beliefs may well be capable of causing such dramatic movements.
Under adaptive learning (top right-hand panel) the movements in the P-D ratio are much
smaller. This observation is fully consistent with Corollary 2 in Section 4.4, given that the
preference parameter γ is set to a value below unity. AL investors act as if their beliefs
will remain unchanged in the future. On balance they value the risky asset less than the
RL investors. Thus, the P-D ratio remains substantially smaller under adaptive learning
and its dynamics less pronounced. However, this simulation is not meant to propose that
the assumption of adaptive learning is necessarily inconsistent with observed behavior the
P-D ratio in the U.S. stock market. It is possible to change the calibration so as to achieve
more pronounced movements in the P-D ratio under adaptive learning. For example, a more
optimistic prior would result in higher valuations of the risky asset from the AL investors’
perspective. As shown in the dynamic simulation reported in the right-hand-side panels
of Figure 3 (solid lines), an initial prior of πAL
1989 = 57%, is suﬃcient to generate more
dramatic rises and falls in the P-D ratio over time. This prior implies a level of optimism,
1 − πAL
1989 = 43%, that is more than double the value used in Figure 2 and above the CCI
data of that period.
Clearly, these simulations indicate that subjective belief dynamics can play an important
role in understanding P-D ratios after stock market crashes. A thorough empirical investi-
gation should be the subject of a future study. Before closing, however, we want to address
a possibly important concern with regard to the theoretical speciﬁcation of preferences we
have used. Barro (2009) and others have suggested that asset-pricing models with CRRA
preferences have diﬃculty matching certain empirical regularities because they restrict the
intertemporal elasticity of substitution to be equal to the inverse of the coeﬃcient of rel-
ative risk aversion. Instead, Epstein-Zin (1989) preferences allow to diﬀerentiate between
26risk aversion and the elasticity of substitution. Thus, in the next section, we provide an
extension to Epstein-Zin preferences. In this case, it is only possible to obtain analytical
solutions for adaptive-learner pricing.
5. Epstein-Zin Preferences
In the following we use the continuous-time formulation and parameterization of recursive
“Epstein-Zin” preferences, suggested by Duﬃe and Epstein (1992a,b) to specify the AL
investor;s utility, namely,
J
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with f (c,J) being a normalized aggregator of continuation utility, J, and current consump-
tion, c,w i t h
f (c,J) ≡ ρ(1 − γ) · J ·
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where η>0 denotes AL’s elasticity of intertemporal substitution, while γ>0i st h e
coeﬃcient of relative risk aversion. Moreover, ˜ ΨAL(D,π) denotes the pricing rule under
Epstein-Zin preferences. Using our HJB solution approach, we show in Appendix D that,
˜ ΨAL (D,π)
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, (31)
which gives some more degrees of freedom for calibration. The special case of γ =1 /η,
corresponds to pricing implied by (21) above, since this is the case in which Epstein-Zin
preferences collapse to standard time-separable preferences with constant relative-risk aver-
sion (we demonstrate this equivalence in Appendix D as well).
27This adaptive learning speciﬁcation with recursive preferences may serve as guidance for
future research. Unfortunately, the case of rational learning would then require numerical
approximation.
6. Conclusion
Recent research on rational-expectations asset-pricing models focuses on proposing variabil-
ity in disaster risk as an explanation for several asset pricing puzzles and, in particular,
for excessively volatile price-dividend (P-D) ratios (see, for example, Gabaix (2008, 2011),
Wachter (2011), and Gourio (2008) and Barro et al. (2010)). Another line of research focuses
on subjective beliefs and learning by investors and questions the assumption of knowledge
of objective frequency distributions of disasters (for example, Weitzman (2007)). We have
developed an asset pricing model with time variable disaster risk and Bayesian learning
by imperfectly informed investors. We have also shown that this model helps understand
episodes in which P-D ratios drop both rapidly and massively, at times intimately connected
with jumps in the dividend process (e.g., see Figure 1). Such observations have also moti-
vated research on bounded rationality and investor sentiment (see, for example, Barberis et
al. (1998)). Instead of following such a research approach, here, we have proposed a theory
that does not require relaxing rationality. Our analysis has only assumed limited informa-
tion, i.e. we have relaxed that investors know everything about the structure of disaster-risk
variability and we have introduced rational Bayesian learning. In addition, we have deﬁned
and analyzed a particular deviation from fully rational behavior in the form of adaptive
Bayesian learning.
A key reason motivating our limited-information approach has been the particular nature
of rare disasters. Given the slow rate at which rare disasters arrive, it is rather diﬃcult to
28argue that investors conﬁdently reach rational expectations about the average frequency of
arrival of disasters (hazard rate). We have demonstrated that, in our setting, indeed, Bayes’
rule does not lead to learning with perfect conﬁdence even after inﬁnite time has passed.
In our model, rational investors may be perfectly aware of their ignorance, and fully
forward-looking, anticipating new information to arrive and future learning to take place.
We show that in such an environment, Bayes’ rule implies that beliefs jump to pessimistic
levels after a rare disaster occurs. These jumps towards pessimism create massive jumps
in demands for assets, and therefore imply massive downward jumps in P-D ratios. When
disasters take long to occur, optimism gradually takes over, and it can lead to high P-D
ratios. These dynamics imitate behavior that is often attributed to investor psychology,
such as sudden investment freezing due to fear after a sudden event with dramatic short-run
consequences occurs, and slow restoration of conﬁdence after a long period of no stock-market
crashes. So, our ﬁndings suggest that, under the assumption of not knowing the stochastic
structure of rare events with dramatic short-run consequences, emotion and logic may meet
each other, in the sense that what is perceived as emotion can be fully rationalized. An
evolutionary psychology perspective might suggest that our results formalize an argument
that the instinct of fear is an endowment by nature that complements rationality.
Asset-pricing dynamics in our illustrative simulations are qualitatively similar between
adaptive and rational learners. However, there are substantial quantitative diﬀerences. The
study of such quantitative diﬀerences between adaptive and rational learning could be an
interesting topic for future research in asset-pricing models. Other important extensions
would concern belief-heterogeneity among investors and second-order learning about rare
disasters. Our setup and analysis could also be generalized in order to include learning
about the possibility of upward jumps. For example, the emergence of a new general-purpose
29technology, may motivate optimistic expectations for a “new economy” with sudden bursts
of investor enthusiasm, triggered by rare upward jumps in the dividend process (sometimes
triggered by the sudden massive entry of new ﬁrms).
307. Appendix A
Proof of Proposition 1
Since the arrival times of jumps are exponentially distributed, at any time t ≥ 0,
Pr{a jump occurs within the time interval [t,t +Δ t]} = Ft (t +Δ t) , (32)
where Ft is the distribution function of future times of disaster conditional upon being at
the time instant t. If the hazard rate of disasters was a ﬁxed parameter ¯ λ,t h e nFt (t +Δ t)
would be equal to 1 − e−¯ λΔt. Yet, under the assumption that the hazard rate is stochastic,
with the hazard-rate distribution being governed by equation (3),
Ft (t +Δ t)=π
∗  
1 − e
−λhΔt 
+( 1− π
∗)
 
1 − e
−λlΔt 
. (33)
Before we take the limit Δt → 0, we must accommodate the idea that, in continuous time,
jumps can occur only once at every instant t. For this reason we modify the deﬁnition given
by (32) as,
Pr{a jump occurs only once within the time interval [t,t +Δ t]} = Ft (t +Δ t) − O(Δt),
in which O(Δt) is the asymptotic order symbol (recall that any function Θ(Δt) ≥ 0i s
O(Δt) if limΔt→0 [Θ(Δt)/Δt] = 0). So, from the distribution function Ft we can construct
its corresponding density function ft through simple diﬀerentiation, i.e.,
Pr{a jump occurs only once within the time interval [t,t + dt)} = dFt (t)=F
 
t (t) · dt ,
(34)
with
F
 
t (t) = lim
Δt→0
Ft (t +Δ t) − Ft (t) − O(Δt)
Δt
.
Notice that for computing F  
t (t), Ft (t) = 0, and limΔt→0 [O(Δt)/Δt] = 0 by deﬁnition, and
given equation (33) L’Hˆ opital’s rule must be used. Doing so leads to F  
t (t)=λ
∗, and together
31with equation (34) the probabilities associated with the occurrence vs. nonoccurrence of
disasters appearing in equation (4) are proved. 
Proof of the asset pricing equation under rational expectations (Equation (8))
For the derivation of equation (8), we ﬁrst show that JRE is given by,
J
RE  
s,D | Ψ
RE 
=
⎧
⎪ ⎨
⎪ ⎩
ΨRE(D)
D
(sD)1−γ
1−γ −
1
ρ(1−γ)
ΨRE(D)
D ln(sD)+φ
RE  
ΨRE 
,i f γ  =1
,i f γ =1
(35)
in which
φ
RE  
Ψ
RE 
=
1
ρ
ΨRE (D)
D
  
μ −
σ2
2
 
+ λ
∗Eζ [ln(1 − ζ)]
 
=
μ − σ2
2 + λ
∗Eζ [ln(1 − ζ)]
ρ2 .
(36)
The ﬁrst-order conditions of (7) are,
c
−γ =
1
ΨRE (D)
· J
RE
s
 
s,D | Ψ
RE 
. (37)
In order to solve the diﬀerential equation given by (7) subject to (37), we take a guess on
the general functional form of JRE  
s,D | ΨRE 
with undetermined coeﬃcients. First, we
examine the case γ  = 1, taking the guess,
J
RE  
s,D | Ψ
RE 
= a + b
(sD)
1−γ
1 − γ
, (38)
in which the undetermined coeﬃcients may depend on ΨRE, and thus be functionals of the
form a
 
ΨRE 
and b
 
ΨRE 
. We drop the dependence of α and b on ΨRE for notational
simplicity. Equation (38) implies,
J
RE
s
 
s,D | Ψ
RE 
= bs
−γD
1−γ , (39)
J
RE
D
 
s,D | Ψ
RE 
= bs
1−γD
−γ ,
32and,
J
RE
DD
 
s,D | Ψ
RE 
= −γbs
1−γD
−γ−1 . (40)
Combining equation (37) with (39) gives,
c =
 
b
D
ΨRE (D)
 − 1
γ
sD . (41)
Since all agents are identical, in equilibrium there is no trade among individuals, and the
representative agent’s demand for assets is s(t)=S (t)=S (0) for all t ≥ 0. This means
that ds(t) = 0 for all t ≥ 0. So, the budget constraint, equation (6), implies that, for all
t ≥ 0, each household consumes her dividend, i.e.
c = sD . (42)
From (42) and (41) we obtain,
b =
ΨRE (D)
D
(43)
Plugging equations (38) through (43) into the HJB equation given by (7), we arrive at,
ρ
 
a +
1
ρ(1 − γ)
 
+[ 1− (ρ − χ − λ
∗ξ)b]
(sD)
1−γ
1 − γ
= 0 . (44)
Setting both the constant of equation (44) and the factor of (sD)
1−γ equal to zero, we obtain
both the pricing function given by (8) and the functional form of JRE  
s,D | ΨRE 
given by
the branch of (35) corresponding to the case of γ  =1 .
For the case in which γ = 1, the guess for JRE  
s,D | ΨRE 
is,
J
RE  
s,D | Ψ
RE 
= a1 + b1 ln(sD),
and the same procedure as above leads to the expression given by the branch of (35) corre-
sponding to the case of γ  =1 .
338. Appendix B – Dynamics of Beliefs about Jumps
Proof of Proposition 2 We derive the law of motion given by (13) in two parts. The
ﬁrst part deals with the belief dynamics when a jump occurs at a particular instant. The
second part derives belief dynamics when a jump does not occur at a particular instant.
Part 1. Belief evolution when a jump occurs at a particular instant
For the evolution of these beliefs over time, let’s ﬁx a time interval Δt>0 of arbitrary
length (Δt does not need to be arbitrarily short), and let’s consider that within Δt aj u m p
event occurs. Since the investor knows that the distribution governing the jump is expo-
nential (it is only that the hazard rate is unclear to him), for any perceived hazard rate ˜ λ,
the probability that the jump event occurs at least once within the interval [t,t +Δ t), is
determined by the distribution function of an exponential random variable,
Pr{jumps occur within the time interval [t,t +Δ t)} =1− e
−˜ λΔt . (45)
Based on (45), and applying Bayes’ rule to the case where a jump has been observed to
have occurred within the time interval [t,t +Δ t), the posterior belief for the probability
that ˜ λ = λh (i.e., the update to the prior π (t)) is,
π(t +Δ t)=
π(t)
 
1 − e−λhΔt 
π (t)(1− e−λhΔt)+[ 1− π(t)](1 − e−λlΔt)
. (46)
The next step is to take the limit Δt ↓ 0 on both sides of equation (46). Yet, for treating
the LHS of (46) we need somewhat diﬀerent notation. In order to distinguish between
prior and posterior π at instant t ≥ 0, let’s keep the notation π (t) for the prior and use
π (t)+dπ(t)|jump in order to capture the posterior in this particular case where the jump
has occurred within the time interval [t,t +Δ t)w h e nΔ t ↓ 0. So,
π(t)+dπ(t)|jump = lim
Δt↓0
π(t)
 
1 − e−λhΔt 
π (t)(1− e−λhΔt)+[ 1− π(t)](1 − e−λlΔt)
,
34and after applying L’Hˆ opital’s rule it is,
π (t)+dπ(t)|jump =
λhπ (t)
Λ(π (t))
. (47)
A key observation about (47) is that whenever a jump occurs in the data, then beliefs jump
as well: beliefs discontinuously move from π (t)t oλhπ (t)/Λ(π (t)).
Part 2. Belief evolution when a jump does not occur at a particular instant
Let’s ﬁx a time interval Δt>0 of arbitrary length (again, Δt does not need to be
arbitrarily short), and let’s consider that within Δt no jump event occurs at all. For any
perceived hazard rate ˜ λ from the perspective of the investor, the probability that the jump
event occurs at least once within the interval [t,t +Δ t), is determined by the distribution
function of an exponential distribution, namely,
Pr{No jumps occur within the time interval [t,t +Δ t)} = e
−˜ λΔt . (48)
In light of (48), after applying Bayes’ rule to the case where no jump has occurred within
t h et i m ei n t e r v a l[ t,t +Δ t), the posterior belief for the probability that ˜ λ = λh (i.e., the
update to the prior π(t)) is,
π (t +Δ t)=
π(t)e−λhΔt
π(t)e−λhΔt +[ 1− π(t)]e−λlΔt . (49)
A problem with (49) can be seen immediately: this posterior belief is well-deﬁned when Δt
is bounded away from 0, yet, for the case of our interest, Δt ↓ 0, the posterior belief seems
to remain constant. However, this is not correct. Even without occurrence of jumps beliefs
still change over time.19 The key to calculating this posterior belief in continuous time is to
observe that, whenever no jumps occur, the posterior belief will follow a deterministic trend
19Observe also that the expression given on the RHS of (47) is a strictly increasing and strictly concave
function of π (t) with two ﬁxed points in the unitary square: 0 and 1. So, if beliefs remain the same while
jumps are not occurring, then successive jumps will make π (t)t oc o n v e r g et o1a st →∞ .
35for that instant. So, in the absence of random events at that instant, it is possible to take
a conventional derivative. This means that we can subtract π(t) from both sides of (49),
divide both sides of (49) by Δt,a n do b t a i n ,
π(t +Δ t) − π(t)
Δt
= π (t)[1− π (t)]
e−(λh−λl)Δt−1
π(t)e−(λh−λl)Δt+1−π(t)
Δt
,
which implies (after applying L’Hˆ opital’s rule),
lim
Δt↓0
π(t +Δ t) − π(t)
Δt
= −(λh − λl)π(t)[1− π (t)] ,
or,
dπ(t)|no jump = −δπ(t)[1− π (t)]dt . (50)
Combining equations (47) and (50) leads to (13). 
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n3 Equation (13) has two parts, a deterministic part and a
stochastic part. The deterministic part is the ﬁrst term of the RHS of (13), which is equal
to −δπ(1 − π), and it deﬁnes a deterministic ﬁrst-order diﬀerential equation,
˙ π = −δπ(1 − π) , (51)
which can be re-written as,
˙ π = δπ
2 − δπ . (52)
Equation (52) is a Bernoulli diﬀerential equation. So, we can use the Bernoulli transforma-
tion
zπ (t) ≡ π (t)
−1 for all t ≥ 0 . (53)
From (53) it is,
˙ zπ (t)=−π (t)
−2 · ˙ π(t) for all t ≥ 0 . (54)
36So, after multiplying both sides of equation (52) by −π−2 and also substituting (53) and
(54) it is,
˙ zπ = δzπ − δ . (55)
The solution to equation (55) is,
zπ (t) − 1=e
δt[zπ (0) − 1] ,
and substituting (53) gives
π (t)=
1
1+eδt1−π0
π0
, for all t ≥ 0 . (56)
Equation (56) shows that, no matter how much time has passed without any jumps occurring,
probability π always stays within the open interval (0,1).
The second part of equation (13) is stochastic and given by a jump process, such that the
probability jumps from its original level π to the level given by λh · π/Λ(π). The statement
π ∈ (0,1) ⇒
λhπ
Λ(π)
∈ (0,1) (57)
holds, because λh·π/Λ(π) > 0 for all π ∈ (0,1), and λh·π/Λ(π) < 1 ⇔ π<1, which is also
true for all π ∈ (0,1). Combining (57) with (56) proves the part of the proposition which
states that for all π (0) = π0 ∈ (0,1), π(t) ∈ (0,1) for all t ≥ 0.
Applying analytical techniques that pertain to Poisson diﬀerential equations on (13), we
obtain,20
E (dπ)
dt
= −δπ(1 − π)+λ
∗
 
λhπ
Λ(π)
− π
 
. (58)
Using the fact that Λ(π∗)=λ
∗ implies π∗ =( λ
∗ − λl)/δ, after some algebra, equation (58)
gives,
˙ π
e = δ
2π(1 − π)
π∗ − π
Λ(π)
. (59)
20See, for example, Merton (1971, pp. 395-401) and Kushner (1967, pp. 16-22).
37For calculating the limit limt→∞E [π (t)], notice that, according to Dynkin’s formula (we
denote the Dynkin operator by D),
E [π(t)] = π (0) + E
   t
0
Dπ(τ)dτ
 
, (60)
in which,
Dπ(τ)=δ
2π(1 − π)
π∗ − π
Λ(π)
, (61)
which is a formula based on equation (59). The expectations operator in the expression
E
   t
0 Dπ(τ)dτ
 
of the RHS of (60) transforms the dynamics of (59) into
˙ π
e = δ
2π
e (1 − π
e)
π∗ − πe
Λ(πe)
, (62)
where πe ≡ E (π). To see that the expectations operator in the expression E
   t
0 Dπ (τ)dτ
 
of the RHS of (60) leads to (62), ﬁx any t ≥ 0a n da n yΔ t>0, and consider equation (60)
expressed as,
π
e (t +Δ t)=E [π (t +Δ t)] = π(t)+E
   t+Δt
t
Dπ(τ)dτ
 
. (63)
If we set Δt>0 arbitrarily small, then (63) and (61) give rise to an approximate recursion
with respect to πe, given by the diﬀerence equation,
π
e (t +Δ t)=π
e (t)+δ
2π
e (t)[1− π
e (t)]
π∗ − πe (t)
Λ(πe (t))
· Δt , (64)
for all discrete periods with interval length [t,t+Δ t]a n da n yt ≥ 0. Equation (64) is a
deterministic equation, since its initial conditions are non-stochastic (πe (0) = π(0) = π0).
Equation (64) is a construction by approximation that leads to diﬀerential equation (62) by
subtracting πe (t) from both sides of (64), dividing by Δt, and taking the limit Δt → 0.
Equation (62) implies dynamics given by,
for all π
e ∈ (0,1), ˙ π
e  0 ⇔ π
e  π
∗ . (65)
38With the help of a one-dimensional phase diagram it can be veriﬁed that limt→∞ E [π (t)] =
limt→∞ πe (t)=π∗, which proves equation (17) of the proposition.
In order to prove equation (18), after applying analytical techniques that pertain to
Poisson diﬀerential equations on (13), we obtain,
E (dπ2)
dt
= −2δπ
2 (1 − π)+λ
∗
  
λhπ
Λ(π)
 2
− π
2
 
,
which simpliﬁes to,
E (dπ2)
dt
= δπ
2 (1 − π)
 
λ
∗ (λh + λl + δπ)
Λ(π)
2 − 2
 
. (66)
Using the same argument as above, we can show that (66) yields
E (dπ2)
dt
= δE
 
π
2  
1 −
 
E
 
π
2   1
2
 
⎡
⎢
⎣
λ
∗
 
λh + λl + δ [E (π2)]
1
2
 
Λ
 
[E (π2)]
1
2
 2 − 2
⎤
⎥
⎦ . (67)
For notational simplicity, we can use the transformation z ≡ E (π2), which makes (67) be
expressed as,
˙ z = δz
 
1 − z
1
2
 
⎡
⎢
⎣
λ
∗
 
λh + λl + δz
1
2
 
Λ
 
z
1
2
 2 − 2
⎤
⎥
⎦ , (68)
since π ∈ (0,1). Because the term δz
 
1 − z
1
2
 
in (68) is always positive for all π ∈ (0,1),
we can focus on the sign of the expression in the bracket of the right-hand side of equation
(68), which is determined by the sign of the expression
f
 
z
1
2
 
≡ z −
δπ∗ − 3λl
2δ
z
1
2 −
λ
∗λh − λl +( λ
∗ − 1)λl
2δ
2 , (69)
and
f
 
z
1
2
 
 0 ⇔ ˙ z  0 . (70)
There exist two real roots for the quadratic form given by (69), namely,
z
1
2
1,2 =
λ
∗ − 4λl ± (λ
∗)
1
2 (λ
∗ +8 λh)
1
2
4δ
,
39and it is easy to verify that one root is negative, while the other is positive. Since π ∈ (0,1)
for all t ≥ 0, we discard the negative root and we keep the positive root which is,
ˆ z
1
2 =
 
 E (π2)
  1
2
=
λ
∗ − 4λl +( λ
∗)
1
2 (λ
∗ +8 λh)
1
2
4δ
,
implying that,
ˆ z =  E (π2)=
 
λ
∗ − 4λl +( λ
∗)
1
2 (λ
∗ +8 λh)
1
2
4δ
 2
. (71)
Most importantly, f
 
z
1
2
 
 0 ⇔ z  ˆ z for all z ∈ (0,1), so through the aid of a one-
dimensional phase diagram, the relationship given by (70) conﬁrms that ˆ z is globally stable,
for all z ∈ (0,1). This means that as t →∞ , E (π2) →  E (π2). Using the fact that,
asymptotically, Va r(π)= E (π2) − (π∗)
2, proves (18). Given that π∗ =( λ
∗ − λl)/δ,a f t e r
some algebra, it can be shown that  E (π2) − (π∗)
2 > 0 ⇔ λh >λ
∗. The right-hand side of
this equivalence is a true statement, completing the proof of the proposition. 
9. Appendix C – Rational Learner’s Solution
This appendix is devoted to proving equations (24) and (25). The ﬁrst-order conditions of
(20) are given by,
c
−γ =
1
ΨRL (D, π)
· J
RL
s
 
s,D, π| Ψ
RL 
, (72)
and the guess we take for the undetermined-coeﬃcients functional form of JRL in the case
γ  =1i s
J
RL  
s,D, π| Ψ
RL 
= κ +( a + bπ)
(sD)
1−γ
1 − γ
(73)
in which the undetermined coeﬃcients, κ, a,a n db, may depend on ΨRL, but we do not
denote this dependence for notational simplicity. Moreover, undetermined coeﬃcients a and
b are diﬀerent from these deﬁned in other appendices. Equation (73) implies
J
RL
s
 
s,D, π| Ψ
RL 
=( a + bπ)s
−γD
1−γ ,
40and after this is combined with (72), the implied formula for consumption is,
c =
 
D
ΨRL (D, π)
· (a + bπ)
 −γ
sD . (74)
So, provided that the guess given by (73) proves to be correct, the market-clearing condition
c = sD combined with (74) implies that the P-D ratio is,
ΨRL (D, π)
D
= a + bπ . (75)
Focusing on the case γ  = 1, and using the guess given by (73) in order to calculate JRL
s , JRL
D ,
JRL
DD,a n dJRL
π , substitution of the resulting functions into the HJB equation (20), together
with the market-clearing condition c = sD, after some algebra, results in the following
expression,
ν1 +( ν2 + ν3 · π)
(sD)
1−γ
1 − γ
= 0 , (76)
in which,
ν1 = ρ
 
κ +
1
ρ(1 − γ)
 
,
ν2 =( ρ − χ − λlξ)a − 1,
and
ν3 = b(ρ − χ − λhξ)+aδξ .
Ideally, it should be possible to make equation (76) hold for any levels of the model’s vari-
ables, π, s,a n dD. The functional form on the left-hand side of equation (76) reveals that
the only way to have equation (76) hold for any arbitrary levels of π, s,a n dD is to set
ν1 = ν2 = ν3 = 0. Indeed, there exist unique values for the undetermined coeﬃcients κ, a,
and b, that make conditions ν1 = ν2 = ν3 = 0 to hold. These values are, κ = −1/[ρ(1 − γ)],
a =1 /(ρ − χ − λlξ), and b = −aδξ/(ρ − χ − λhξ), and after these values are combined
41with (75), and (73), equation (24) and the part of equation (25) that refers to the case in
which γ  = 1 are both validated.
For the case γ = 1, we take a guess of the form
J
RL  
s,D, π| Ψ
RL 
= a1 · ln(sD)+b1π + κ1 ,
and following the same procedure as above we arrive at the part of equation (25) that refers
to the case in which γ =1 .
10. Appendix D
To see that preferences given by equations (29) and (30) lead to standard time-separable
preferences with constant relative-risk aversion when γ =1 /η, notice that (30) implies,
f (c,J)|γ= 1
η = ρ
c1−γ
1 − γ
− ρJ . (77)
To simplify notation, let’s denote J at time t ≥ 0b yJ (t), and let’s use J  (t) in order to
denote the total derivative of J with respect to time evaluated at time t. Using this notation,
equation (29) implies that J  (t)=−f (c(t),J(t)), so (77) gives,
−J
  (t)=ρ
c(t)
1−γ
1 − γ
− ρJ (t).
Multiplying the above equation by (1/ρ)e−ρt, and integrating with respect to time, gives,
−
1
ρ
  ∞
0
e
−ρtJ
  (t)dt =
  ∞
0
e
−ρtc(t)
1−γ
1 − γ
dt −
  ∞
0
e
−ρtJ (t)dt .
After applying integration by parts in order to calculate the integral on the left-hand side
of the above equation, we obtain,
1
ρ
 
J (0) − lim
t→∞
e
−ρtJ (t)
 
=
  ∞
0
e
−ρtc(t)
1−γ
1 − γ
dt . (78)
42With lifetime utility J (t) being always bounded (i.e., limt→∞J (t) < ∞,t o o ) ,l i m t→∞e−ρtJ (t)=
0, so (78) implies
J (0) = ρ
  ∞
0
e
−ρtc(t)
1−γ
1 − γ
dt , (79)
which reveals that γ =1 /η implies that continuation utility is time separable of the form
analyzed throughout Sections 2-4 of the paper.
Proof of the asset pricing equation under adaptive expectations and Epstein-
Zin preferences (Equation (31))
For the derivation of equation (31), notice that the form of the HJB equation with
Epstein-Zin preferences is,
0= m a x
c≥0
 
f
 
c,J
 
s,D,π | ˜ Ψ
AL
  
+ Js
 
s,D,π | ˜ Ψ
AL
 
·
 
1
˜ ΨAL (D,π)
(sD − c)
 
+
+JD
 
s,D,π | ˜ Ψ
AL
 
· μD + JDD
 
s,D,π | ˜ Ψ
AL
  (sD)
2
2
+
+Λ(π)
 
Eζ
 
J
 
s,(1 − ζ)D,π | ˜ Ψ
AL
  
− J
 
s,D,π | ˜ Ψ
AL
  
 
. (80)
First-order conditions are,
fc
 
c,J
 
s,D,π | ˜ Ψ
AL
  
=
Js
 
s,D,π | ˜ ΨAL
 
˜ ΨAL (D,π)
. (81)
Our guess for the functional form of J is,
J
 
s,D,π | ˜ Ψ
AL
 
= b(π)
(sD)
1−γ
1 − γ
, (82)
and we denote b(π)b yb for notational simplicity. Since c = SD in equilibrium, (81) implies,
D
˜ ΨAL(D,π)
= ρb
1
η −1
1−γ . (83)
43Substituting (82) and its implied derivatives into (80) gives, after some algebra,
ρb
1
η −1
1−γ = ρ −
 
1 −
1
η
  
μ − γ
σ2
2
 
+
1 − 1
η
1 − γ
Λ(π)
 
Eζ (1 − ζ)
1−γ − 1
 
. (84)
Combining (83) with (84) leads to (31).
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